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A collection ofone or more df;llices, caell described by
irs Digital Device Manual and reachable over a nChllork,
is a COllncctedSpace. A set of safety policies may be en-
forced 011 a ConllectedSpace to ensure ti,e safety ofllle en-
vironment in which ti,e ConnecredSpace is deployed. The
enforcement of these safery policies by one or more safety
cOl/trollers govems the behavior of ti,e devices witllin the
ConnectedSpace. We propose a policy-based partitioning
schemefor synthesizing k distributed safety controllers such
that (a) each device ;s guaranteed to be controlled by no
more thall twO colltrollers. and (b) each policy is guarall-
teed to be enforced by exactly one controller. We present
all experimentaL evaLuatiOIl ofollr scheme. Ti,e experimen-
tal reslllts show thut the sc/leme is scalable with respect to
ti,e nllmber ofdevices and ti,e 1I/lmber ofpolicies. We afso
sllow how safety controLLers. lhat are correct witll respect to
tlle policies. are synthesized /Ising the tlleory ofsupervisory
comroI.
1. Introduction
Devices controlled via embedded software are becoming
widespread. Many such devices are capable of connecting
to a local network or the Internet. It may also be possible
to monitor and conlrol such devices from a remote location.
Such devices are sometimes referred to as "smart" devices.
A ConnectedSpace is a collection of one or more such de-
vices. ConnectedSpaces are often deployed in environments
such as aircraft, hospitals and health care units. automo-
biles. and homes. In such environmenls. interactions of two
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or more devices may lead to an unsafe situation. For exam-
ple, consider the cabin of a passenger aircraft. NASA's Air
Safety Reporting System lists 52 incidents where a ponable
electronic device was suspected to interfere with the air·
craft navigation and control syslems [2, 3]. For example,
the headphones used by a passenger on a Boeing 757 was
suspected to have caused all three autopilot systems on the
aircraft (0 SlOp functioning. The use of a cellular phone in-
side a Cessna 340/A was reported as the likely cause for
erroneous readings of the cockpit melers. Similar examples
may be found in hospital and health care environments. For
example, the interference of an Magnetic Resonance Imag-
ing device with a cardiac Pacemaker is well known [IB}.
Such interference may even be fatal [1].
In each of the above examples. the unsafe situation might
arise due to the interaction amongst two or more devices
that are individually safe. Such unsafe situations may
be prevented by enforcing safety policies on the Connect-
edSpace to which the devices belong. Several analysis tools
such as fault-trees and Petri nets may be used to obtain the
safety policies [6, 7]. Though safety policies exist for many
environments [5]. to our knowledge there do not seem 10
exist any safety slandard for the automatic enforcement of
such policies on an arbitrary collection ofdevices. The abil-
ity to remotely monitor and control the devices provides op-
ponunities for the automatic enforcement of the policies.
Also. the environments in which these devices exist may be
modeled as a ConnectedSpace. For instance, an imaging
room in a health care unit. or an aircraft. may be modeled
as a ConnectedSpace. The safety policies for such environ-
ments may then be enforced on the ConnectedSpace by one
or more safety controllers.
The theory of supervisory control of Discrete Event
Systems (DES), based on a framework of automata and
formal languages, was proposed by Ramadge and Won-
ham [12, 13]. This theory (RW theory) can be used to syn-
thesize a controller when the DES and the control specifi-
cations (policies) are both modeled as generators of formal
languages. The conlroller is guaranteed to be correct with
respect to the specificalion.
Ostroff [9, 10] proposed a framework based 00 Timed
Transition Model (TIM) and Real-Time Temporal Logic
(RITL) for synthesizing conlrollers for Real-time DES
(RDES). Given an ROES modeled using TIM, and the
control specifications expressed using RTTL, the conlroller
may be synthesized using the Controller Design Procedure
(COP) described in [9]. Braodin and Wonham [4J show
how the RW theory may be used for RDES. Sridharan et
aJ. [15] describe CS-CDP, a modified COP, for synthesiz-
ing a monolithic safety conlroller for ConnectedSpaces. It
is important to emphasize that these techniques employ a
cOllstructive approach in comrast to a verifica/ioll-based
approach for synthesizing conlrollets. A constructive ap-
proach aims at the synthesis of a controller that is correct
with respect (0 a given specification. In a verification-based
approach, the controller is synthesized and then verified for
its correctness. The automated synthesis of correcl safety
conlrollers is crilical in ConnectedSpaces. A constructive
approach is useful in such situations.
A. Ollr Colltriblftiolls
l. A policy-based partitioning scheme (PPS) is proposed
for suitably partitioning a given set of safety policies
into disjoint sets.
2. PPS is evaluated experimentally and the results are
presemed.
3. The procedure for synthesizing the safety controllers,
using the partitions generated by the PPS, is described.
B. Organization ofthis Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Con·
nectedSpaces are described in Section 2. Safety policies are
defined in Section 3. The criteria for the synthesis of the
controllers are enumerated in Section 4. Section 5 presents
the policy-based partitioning scheme. The results of an ex-
perimental evaluation ofPPS is presented in Section 6. Sec-
tion 7 describes the procedure for synthesizing the safety
controllers using CS-CDP. Possible extensions of the work
are discussed in Section 8.
2. ConnectedSpaces
A collection of one or more devices, each described by
its Digital Device Manual and reachable over a network, is
a ConnectedSpace. The behavior, services, and attributes
of each device is specified in the form of a Digital Device
Manual (DDM) [IS, 16, 17}. A device may carry either its
DDM or a pointer to the location of its DDM. The DDM for
a cardiac Pacemaker is shown in Figure l.
Formally, a ConnectedSpace is defined as CS =
{D t ,D2 , •.• ,Dm } where each D"i=l ... m, is aDDM. A
DDM D is given by (CSM,F,LS,O, A) where
• CSM is an augmented finite state automaton
for the device. CSM is given by a 6-tuple
(Q,L,o,n,qo,SD) where Q = Qu U Qs is a fi-
nite set of states, E is a possibly empty set of events,
o:Q x E ----> Q is the transition function, n :E ----> N
gives the cost associated with a lransition, qo is the ini-
Lial state of the device, and S D : Q ----> string is the
semalltic descriptioll function. Qs and Qu are non-
empty sets of slales such that "Is E Qu, there is a
7 E E such that 0(5,7) E Qs' In practice, Qu may
consist of states that may potentially lead to an unsafe
situation, and Qs consists of states that arc guaranteed
not to cause aoy unsafe situation. For the purpose of
this paper, we assume that n gives the maximum time
duration required to complete a transition.
• F = {fo, ft, 12,·· ., fb} is a set of mapping functions.
fo : 0 ----> E must be defined by all devices. fo maps
the functionality of the device to an event in the finite
state machine.
• LS = {1o•11 , ... ,1,.} is a set of labels where each
li, i = 1 ... r identifies a particular geographic loca-
tion.
• 0 = {Ot, 02, ... , Oil} is the set of services provided by
the device. Invocation of 0i, i = 1 ... u generates an
event (J E E.
• A = {al' a2,' .. ,a,.,cllrSrare, cllrLoc} is the set of at-
tributes exported by the device. CllrState E Q and cllr-
Loc E LS specify the current slate and location of the
device, respectively, and are exported by all devices.
The initial values of cllrS/ate and cllrLoc are set to qo
and 1o, respectively.
The safe behavior of a ConnectedSpace is governed by
the correct enforcement of the associated safety policies.
The policies are assumed to reside in a Policy Server (PS).
The policies may be added, deleted, or modified at any time
during the operation of the ConnectedSpace. In addition,
the number and type of the constituent devices may also
change. Such a change may be detected by a Device Dis-
covery Service (DDS). DDS may utilize an appropriate dis-
covery protocol. Each device must adhere to the discov-
ery protocol. The policies in PS may be enforced by a
Safery Collfroller (SC). An architecture for enforcing a set
of safety policies would consist of the ConnectedSpace, the
policy server, the device discovery service, and one or more
safety controllers. Figure 2 shows an enforcement architec-
ture with distributed safety conlrollers. The PPS approach
proposed in this work addresses the issue of synthesizing
safety conlrollers for such an architecture.
Figure 1. A DDM for a cardiac Pacemaker.
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that differ in their safely criticality requirements. For ex-
ample, it is possible for a laboratory to require a low safety
criticality for certain policies, i.e. it may tolerate violations
of these policies for a brief period, whereas a health care
unit may not tolerate any safety violation. The notion of
policy relaxation duration helps specify and enforce such a
requirement. It is possible that the devices constituting lhe
ConnectedSpace may have varying safety criticality. Also,
the same type ofdevice may have differing safety criticality
depending on lhe environment and the safety policies lhat
govern its behavior. The notion of safety criticality rank
provides the abililY to specify and enforce such require-
ments.
Consider a ConnectedSpace that consists of a Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI) device and a cardiac Pacemaker
(PM). For such a ConnectedSpace, a safety policy may
be specified as PMSAFE = ""(curStatepM ::: PACING
A curStateMRt::: IMAGING) <PM,MRI>(25). The pol-
icy is interpreted as follows. The policy is violated when
PM and MRI are in PACING and IMAGING states, respec-
tively. Also, PM has a higher safety criticality rank than
MRI. Hence, when PM is in PACING, MRI must not be
allowed to move to IMAGING. IfMRI is already in IMAG-
ING, and if lhere is a request to move PM to PACING, then
lhe safety controller has the option of moving :MRI to a
different state in order to pennit the request. Also, during
lhis move, lhe boolean expression must not remain false for
























Figure 2. An enforcement architecture with
distributed safety controllers.
4. Criteria for safety controller synthesis
In safety-critical systems such as a ConnectedSpace, sev-
eral criteria constrain the synthesis of lhe controller. The
following criteria are addressed in lhis work.
3. Safety policies
A safety policy P is a 3-tuple given by P=(I,O,r)
where I is a boolean expression in the attributes and slates
oflhe devices in the ConnectedSpace, 0 is an ordered list of
labels that identify a device, and r E N. The list 0 consists
of the labels C•• i = 1 .. .p, of those devices whose states
or attributes occur in I. A label Gi , i = 1 ... p. is associ-
ated with deviceDi _ 0 is represented as <Cl , C2, .. . , Cp >
where SCR(P,D i ) < SCR(P,Di+t}. i = 1. .. p - l.
SCR: P x CS -; N defines tlle rank of a device w.e.l a pol-
icy P. SeR(p, D i ) is the safery criricaliry rank of D, w.e.t
P. The boolean expression I is fonned using lhe attributes
and lhe Qu states of one or more devices.
A safety policy P is considered violated when I remains
false for a duration greater lhan r. r, specified in appropri-
ate time units, is lhe relaxLltioll dllration for P. It is pos-
sible that ConnectedSpaces are deployed in environments
RI. The tennination ofa controller must only affect the be-
havior of a subset of devices in the ConnectedSpace.
R2. Across ConnectedSpaces, each device must be con-
trolled by a fixed number of controllers.
R3. The controller must be correct wilh respecl to the
safety policies.
RI is important for ensuring that lhe safe behavior of
the ConnectedSpace is enforced in a fault-tolerant manner.
R2 is important in the design of devices that have a lim-
ited memory. Such devices may enter and leave multiple
ConnectedSpaces. When such a device exists in a Con-
nectedSpace, and is controlled by one or more safety con-
trollers, all requests aniving at the device may be sent to
a controller for authorization. The addresses of these con-
trollers may be stored in the device's memory. Typically,
the amount of memory for storing lhese addresses is fixed.
If the maximum number of controllers for each device is
not fixed, then it is possible for the device to cause an un-
safe situation. The inability of the device 10 contact all its
controllers. due to the insufficient memory to store all the
addresses. may cause such a situation. R3 is vital in safety-
critical systems such as ConnectedSpaces. To enforce a safe
behavior on such systems, the safety policies must correctly
model the safe behavior. Also, the comroller must be cor-
rect with respect to the policies. An incorrect controller may
lead to unsafe situations Ihat are difficult to detect and diag-
nose.
5. Policy~based partitioning scheme
Rl may be satisfied using dislribuled safety controllers.
and by assigning only a subset of policies and devices to
each controller. The assignment of policies and devices to
controllers must also salisfy R2. The proposed policy-based
partitioning scheme (PPS) produces partitions, consisting of
policies and devices, that satisfy RI and R2. PPS produces
non-empty partitions such that each device is present in no
more Ihan 2 partitions, and where each policy is assigned to
a unique partition.
Given a ConnectedSpace CS. a set of safety policies
SP, and the suggested number of partitions 9 E N, PPS
computes a set of partitions pp = {81> 82, ... ,8d, 2 :S
k :S g, where Gi = (V;, Bi ). if, ~ SP and Bi ~ CS,
i = 1 ... k. The following properties are valid for the parti-
tions produced by PPS.
Propl. V; n Vi = 0. i -I- j. i,j = 1 ... k.
Prop2. "Ie E B; n Bj • e ¢. Bi n Bp and e ¢. Bq n Bj ,
where Gp , Gq E pp.
PPS constructs a matrix. called apo/icy partition matrix
(pPM) using CS and SP. PPM is similar to an adjacency
matrix for an undirected graph. An edge-weighted, undi-
rected graph G is then constructed from PPM. A heuristic.
that exploits the presence of bridges in G, is used to assign
weights to the edges of G. PPM uses the heuristic to max-
imize k. A minimum-weight k-cut of G is then obtained
using the SPLIT [l4] algorithm. The cut is used to obtain
the corresponding partitions of CS and SP.
PPS is implemented by executing procedures
Proel [16]. Proe2, and Proe3 in sequence. Proel
constructs the PPM. Proe2 constructs G from PPM. The
set of partitions pp is then computed by Proe3. Proe2
is shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Step 4 and Step 5
of Proe2 implement the heuristic. Proe3 is shown in
Figure 5.
The characteristics of the results produced by SPLIT
may be used 10 show that Propl and Prop2 are indeed
true. By definition. the partitions produced by SPLIT sat-
isfy V; n Vj =0. i -I- j. Each Pi E SP corresponds to
PROCEDURE Proc2.
INPUT: A policy panilion matrix PPM;.j. i = I ... n. j =
I ... m.
OUTPUT: (a) An edge-weighted, undirected graph G = (V,E)
where V = (Vl,V2, ... ,v",d1 , ... ,db }. b .:S m. and E =
{C\,e2, ... ,Cr }, T ;::: m are the set of vertices and edges, re-
speclively. (b) A weighl funClion w: E -+ IR.+.
1. initializeNj = O,i = I ... m, V = 0.£ = 0.
2. fori = I ... ndo
create vertex V; and add to V.
fori=I ... mdo
" "if L:PPMi.j = 1 or L:PPM;.i > 21hen
;=1 ;=1
create vertex dj and add il to V.
3.forj=I mdo
fori=I ndo
ifPPMi.j = 1 then
add v; to Nj •
ir EPPMi,i = 2 then
i=1
lel e = (Vi, V q ) be an edge labelled Dj,p,q such that
PPMi,q = 1. i f= q.
ife ~ E then add e toE.
set w(e) = 1.
'J>,
add edge e = (Vi. dj ) 10 E.
set w(e) = 00. (continued in Figure 4)
Figure 3. The procedure Proe2 to express a
policy partition matrix as an edge-weighted,
undirected graph G.
exactly one vertex Vi E V of G. Hence, i'. n Vj = 0. i 'f:. j
is satisfied for the sets i'., i,j = 1 ... k produced by Step 6
of Proe3. Hence, Propl is true. Also. SPLIT produces
partitions such Ihat E i n Ej = 0, i -I- j, i,j = 1 ... k. and
E- {Ell E2 , .•• ,Ed =S. Hence, Bj nBj = 0. i -I- i,
i,j = 1 ... k is true. In Step 7 of Proc3. for each edge
Dj,p,q E S, the corresponding Dj E SP is added to exactly
two sets Eg and Ell. Hence, prop2 is true.
5.1. An example
Consider a ConnectedSpace CSPACE =
{Di,D2,Ds,D4,Ds,D6,D7,Ds,D9,DtO} where D"
. i=l ... 10, is the DDM for device D,. Let polset
= {P1,P2,PS,P4,PS,P6,P7,PS} where Pi=(I.,Oi,rj).
i=1 ... 8, be the set ofsafety policies. LetIr = -,(curStatel
= qI,l /\ curState2 = Q2,1), 12 = -'(curState2 = q2,2 /\
curStates = qs,d. Is = -'(curStatc2 = q2,i V curStates
= qs.o V curStatcs = qS,4). 14 = -,(curStates = q3,O
/\ (curStatcs = qs,s V curStates = qs,o V curStatcs
= qs.~). Is = -,(curState~ = Q4,6). h = -'(curState4
PROCEDURE Proc2 (continued).
4. letB = {b l ,b:2, ... ,b,}, 0 '5 I '5 IE! be the set of bridges
ofG.
forj=I ... m.do
"if L: PPM;.j ,:5 2 then
i=1
initialize tS j to l.
else initialize tS j to O.
fori=I ... ldo
lctbi = (vp,d j ).
iftsj = 0 then
settsj = 1 and w(bi ) = 1.
5. for j = I ... m.do
sort Ihe vertices in Nj in the ascending order of their
degree.
"if L:PPMi,j > 2 and tSj = othen
;=1
forz=I ... [Njldo
let N i = UI U Uz such that 'rfu = (w~, v) E UI,
w(u) = 1, and 'rfu = (w~, v) E Uz, w(u) = 00.
if jUll = degree(w~) - 1 then
setw(u) = 1, Uz = {u}, and tSj = 1.
if tS j = 1 then
let V E Nj be a vertex such that degree(v) ,:5degree(u),
'rfuENj.u=!-v.
set wee) = 1, where e = (v,d j ) E E, and tSj = 1.
Figure 4'. Continuation of procedure Proc2 to
express a policy partition matrix as an edge-
weighted. undirected graph G.
= q4,1 1\ curState6 = q6,0), 17 = -'(curStatcs =
Qs,s V curStateo = Q6,3), and Is = -'(curStatc7 =
Q7,3 V curStateg = Q9,2). qj,1.: E Qj is 0. slate of device
Dj. Table 1 shows Ihe PPM for CSPACE. Since D 10 does
not occur in any policy. !he corresponding column ClQ is
removed from Ihe PPM.
Step 2 of Proe2 creates Ihe vertex set
V={VL, V2, V3, V4, VS, V6, V7, Vs, d1=Vg, d2=1JI0' d,,=1J11,d7=
V12, d9=V13} of G. Step 3 computes N 1={vl},
N2={Vl' V2, V3}, N3={V2, V3}. N4={V4, Vs, vo},
NS={V4.Vr}, N6={V6,Vr}, N7={vs}, NS={V3,V4}.
and Ng={vs}. In Step 3, Ihe edges are created and added
to E. Since IN11= I, an edge D 1,1,9 is added between
vertices VI and Vg. Since IN2 1 = 3, edges D2,1,10,
D2,1,1O. and D2,3,1O are added between !he pairs of vertices
(V2.VIO). (Vl,VlO), and (V3,VI0), respeclively. Step 3
produces E = {DI,1,9, D2,1,1O' D2 ,2,IO' D2,3,10' D3,2,3,
D 4,4,11l D 4,1,1l' D 4 ,0,1l> D S,4,7, D O,0,7, D7,12,8,
DS ,3,4, D9,13,S}. Figure 6 shows Ihe undirected graph G
and the weight function w for CSPACE.
Let the suggested number of partitions be 9 = 5.
Proe3 computes kma:r = 6 by executing SPLIT for
PROCEDURE Proc3.
INPUT: (a) An edge.weighted, undirected graph G = (V, E)
where V = {vl,vz, ... ,vn ,dl ,d2, ... ,db }, 0'5 b'5 m, and
E = {ell C2" •• I e~} , T ;::: m are the sel ofverticcs und edges,
respectively. (b) A weight function 10 : E -> R+.
(c) The suggested number of partitions 9 '5 n.
OUTPUT: A set ofpartitiolls pp = {GI,G2 , ... ,Gd, where
k '5 g, G; = (\1;,£;), Vi ~ SP, andE ~ as, i = 1. . . k.
I. letE = EI UEz such that'rle E El,w(e) = I,and'rfe E E2,
w(e) = 00.
2. let cc = {G~,G;, . .. ,G~mo,,} be the cOlll1ected cOlI/pol/elJls
of C' = (V, Ed.
3. if 9 > k",,,,, thcn
set k = krrl""" PP = cc and proceed to Slep 6.
4. setk=g.
5. dctermine the k-cul for G using the SPLIT algoriLhm.
let p = {G II G2, ... ,Gk} be the partitions of G, and let
S = {el' C2, ... ,e3 } be the edges of the cut, produced by the
algorithm. p is obtained by removing the edges in S from E.
Each partition G; E p is a connected componellt. G; is given
by G = (Vo, E;) where Vo s;: V und E; ~ E.
6. foreachGi EP,i= 1... kdo
set if; = 0andEi = 0.
for each v~ E Vi do
add lhe corresponding P~ E SP to V;.
for each edge e = (vp , vq ) E E; labelled Dj,p,q do
add the corresponding D j E as to Ei.
7. for each edge ei = (vp,dj ) E S, i = 1 ... s do
add the corresponding Dj E as 10 Ew and E" where
vp E Ew and vq E E", p =!- q.
8. seIpp = {GIl C2, ... ,Cd where Gj = (Vi, E.), i = 1. .. k.
Figure 5. Procedure Proc3 for partitioning an
edge-weighted, undirected graph G of a Con-
nectedSpace.
k=g=5. Proe3 computes p = {Gl,G2.G3,G4,G5}
where G1 = ({Vl,Vg}, {D1,1,9, D 2,1,1O})' G2 =
({V2. V3, VIO}. {D2,1,0, D2,2,1O, D2,3,10, D3,2,3, DS,3,4}).
G3 = ({v",VO,V7,Vl1}. {D4 ,4,11> D4,6,1I. D4 ,5,1l, D5,4,7,
DO,0,7, DS ,3,4}), G4 = ({vs}, {D4,5,U}). and G s =
({V8,VI2,VI3}. {D9,13,8.D7,12,S}). The set of partitions
pp = {G l , G2 • G3 , G4 , as} produced by Step 8 is shown in
Table 2.
6. Experimental evaluation of PPS
PPS was implemented in C++ using the LEDA [8] li-
braries. The implementation was used to experiment with
PPS. The experimenrs were conducted on a Pentium-III ma-
chine, with 256MB of RAM. operating at 700MHz., and
running Ihe Linux operaling system.
A set of safety policies SP is characterized using the
notion of density. The density d of SP is defined using
B!;:;E w(b),bEH
r:":I ~ ..u Q ~,.,. r:":I
2,1.10, D3,2,3, D4,~.11
DS.4.7 , Dn,n, 7, DO,3.4
on (a) Tproel' Tproe2' and Tproe3' (b) the maximum
number of partitions kmo.:z: produced by PPS. (c) the num-
ber of edges lEI of G, and (d) the average degree per vertex
deYo.ug ofG.
For each class of ConnectedSpace, representative values
for n, m, and k are chosen. SP is then generated uni-
fonnly at random. A single run of the experiment consists
of executing PPS for d = 0.1, 0.2, ... ,1, for each class. For
each run of the experiment, values of k",u.:z:, Tproct. Tpro"2,
Tproc3, lEI, JVI, and degavg are collected, The values are
then averaged over 10 runs of the experiment.
Table 3 shows the representative values of n, m, k, IE),
and lVI, for d = 0.4, for each of the four classes. Table 3
also shows the average values ofTproc2,Tproc3,andTpps,
The effect of density on Tpps is shown in Figure 7, As
may be observed from Table 3 and Figure7. Tpps increases
wilh increasing size of the ConnecledSpace and the density
of SP. As can be observed from Table 3. the percentage
CPU usage of Proe3 increases with increase in the size
of the ConnectcdSpace. Also, the running lime of PPS is
dominated by Prod.
The impacl of d on kma:z: is shown in Figure 8, As may
be observed from the figure. the value of kma:z: is higher for
o< d < D,S. For d :::: 0.5. kmo.:z: drops to 2. This effect may
be observed for each of the four classes. This is due to the
increase in deYavg with increasing d. Figure 9 and Figure
10 show the impacl of d on degavg and lEI, respectively.
As may be observed from the figures, both davg and lEI
increase linearly wilh respect 10 d,
I I c,
.
I G1 I C, I c, I G8 I I I I Ic, c, c. C,
R, , , 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R, 0 , , 0 0 0 0 0 0
n, 0 , , 0 0 0 0 , 0
• 0 0 0
, , 0 0 , 0
Rn 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 0 0
R, 0 0 0 , , , , 0 0
R, 0 0 0 0 , , 0 0 0
• 0 0 0 0 0 0
, 0 ,
1,1,0, 1,1,10. 2,~.10,
D1.3,lO, D 4 ,4.11, D 4 ,8,11,
D4 ,o,II, D 7 ,12,8, Do ,I3,a 00
Table 1. The policy partition matrix for
CSPACE
Figure 6. The undirected graph G = (V, E) and
the weight function w for CSPACE.
the corresponding PPM. Specifically. density is calculated
~"PPM·~ ~ '·1
as d = ;=1 j=~.m • The size of a ConnectedSpace CS is
specified by the number of policies n = ISPI and the num-
ber of devices m = ICSI. ConnectedSpaces are classified
based on their size as (a) small, (b) medium. (c) large,
and (d) huge, The CPU usage, in seconds. of Proel,
Proe2, and Proe3 are denoted by Tproel. T proe2,
and Tproe3' respectively. The CPU usage for the com·
bined execution of Proel. Proe2. and Proe3, is denoted
by Tpps.
For each of the four classes of ConnectedSpaces, exper-
iments were conducted to study the impact of d, n, and m.
Table 2. The partitions for CSPACE.
I Partilions I
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Table 3. The characterlsllc values of n. m,
k, IVI. and lEI for each of the four classes
of ConnectedSpaces are shown In this table.
The average values of Tproc2. Tproc3. and Tpps
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7. Synthesizing the safety controllers
A safely controller for a ConnectedSpace may be synthe-
sized using CS·CDP by expressing the ConnectedSpace and
lhe safety policies using TIM and RITL. respeclively [15].
CS-CDP produces a safety controller SC and a control ta-
ble. SC is specified using a finite state nutomaton. The
control table defines the action that muSl be taken by the
controlleron!eceivin~ an event. Given the sel of partilions
pp = {G I , G2 , ... ,Gk }, a controller is assigned to each
partition. The sel of k controllers may then be obtained by
executing SynthProc [16] on each partition in pp. By
Propl. each policy is enforced by exactly one controller.
By Prop2, a device is controlled by no more than two con-
..
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Figure 7. The effect of density on the total
CPU usage Tpps for executing PPS.
trollers. Table 4 shows the assignment of devices and poli-
cies to safety conlrollers for CSPACE.
Table 4. The assignment of devices and poli-
cies to safety controllers, for CSPACE.
I Device I S~fCIY Controller II
"""
I Safety CODlrtIlier I
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Let D7 E CSPACE and Dg E CSPACE be PM
and MRI, respectively. The DDMs for PM and
MRI nre shown in Figure 1 and [16], respectively.
Let Pa E polset be Pa=-,(cuTStatepM=PACING
A curStateMR1=IMAGING) <PM,MRl>(25). Hence,
Q7,3=PACING and qg,2=IMAGING. The safety controller
BCs may be synthesized by using SynthProc on input
85 of CSPACE (16). The states, the state transition
function, and the control table for ses are described in
[16]. IfMRl is currently in state IMAGING. and ASense is
requested, ses will enable (allow) ASense and then force
the transition Stop on MRI. When PM is in state PACING,
and the transition Start is requested, it will be disabled
(denied). Hence, all transitions of a higher ranked device.
such as PM in the example. will be enabled while adhering





Figure 8. The effect of density on the maxi-
mum number of partitions kmaz produced by
PPS,
8. Summary and further work
ConnectedSpaces and Digital Device Manuals are de-
scribed in this paper. A policy-based partitioning scheme is
proposed for the synthesis of distributed safety controllers.
The results of an experimental evaluation of the scheme is
presented. A procedure for synmesizing the safety con-
trollers, using me theory of supervisory control. is de-
scribed.
Two limitations of PPS need to be addressed. (l) For
safety policies with density> 0.5, the bridge-based heuris-
tic may only produce a maximumof2 panitions. To address
this limitation, alternate heuristics need to be investigated.
(2) In addition to the boolean expression I of a safety pol-
icy, the safety criticality ranks of the devices may also need
to be incorporated into the graph model. Addressing this
limitation may be useful in environments where a subset of
the safety controllers need to be made more fault-tolerant
than the others.
The constructive approach for controller synthesis de-
scribed in this paper is suitable in environments where me
controllers are deployed external to the devices. Situations
might arise where it may not be possible to deploy external
safety controllers. A ConnectedSpace in a battle field or an
open soccer field are examples ofsuch situations. These sit-
uations may require the use ofembedded safety controllers.
The possible use ofPPS for me synthesis ofembedded con·
trollers needs to be investigated. In these situations, it is also
possible that the number and types ofdevices. and the safety
policies are modified frequently. A long execution duration
of PPS may not be acceptable in such cases. To address
,,' -",--;'-7.-"--'''-'''--:;-7.~~ •• G. •• •• .0 0 •• Of
-
Figure 10. The effect of density on the total
number of edges JEI of G.
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Figure 9. The effect of density on the average
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Ihis issue, the use of incremental partitioning schemes [11J
needs to be investigated.
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